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Gender and Democratic Politics : A
Comparative Analysis of Consolidation
in Argentina and Chile*
GEORGINA WAYLEN
Abstract. This article highlights a number of themes useful in the gendered
analysis of democratic consolidation in Latin America by means of a comparative
analysis of Argentina and Chile. It starts from the assumption that much of the
work on democratisation in Latin America – both orthodox and the literature
concentrating on women and transitions – produced up until now, has been too
voluntaristic in its approach. It argues that what is needed, particularly in the
study of democratic consolidation, is an analysis not only of the impact of women
and women’s organisations on institutions and structures but also of how these
institutions and structures can shape and change gender relations and different
women’s activities. Any gendered analysis of democratic consolidation must
begin by examining the terms of transition which, while they can be subject to
some renegotiation later, affect the nature of the subsequent system and the space
available to different actors. It is argued that a number of characteristics of the
post-transition system are significant : first the impact of more arbitrary populist
or presidential systems, second the importance of women’s organising both inside
and outside the state and party systems and third the existence of an
institutionalised party system.
In recent years the study of democratisation in Latin America has shifted
from an examination of the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and the
subsequent transition to competitive electoral politics to a focus on
consolidation. Part of a trend within comparative politics more generally,
this literature returned the focus of analysis to the nature of institutions
and examined their role in the consolidation of democracy." This
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development marked a move away from the more voluntaristic focus of
much of the early democratisation literature which gave great emphasis to
the choices and decisions of elites without providing sufficient con-
sideration of the impact of (political) institutions and structures on actors’
decisions and outcomes.# While this actor-orientated emphasis may have
been more justified in the earlier ‘phases ’ of democratisation, it became
less relevant once political institutions began to reassert themselves.
Much of the mainstream literature has focused on a number of issues :
what is meant by democratic consolidation, which types of transitions and
systems are more or less likely to become consolidated and what can be
done to encourage consolidation.$ Although scholars have differed
in their exact definition, consolidation is generally seen as the
institutionalisation of a competitive electoral system that is accompanied
by a commitment to and a consensus about the ‘rules of the game’. A
system in which ‘democracy becomes the only game in town’ is seen as
likely to endure.% Concern has been expressed by political scientists at a
number of characteristics which are seen as reducing the likelihood that
democratising systems in Latin America will become consolidated. These
include: the weakness and even collapse of political parties, the emergence
of ‘delegative democracy ’, plebiscitarianism and presidentialism and its
combination with multipartism.& Many commentators stress the im-
portance of the role played by the political parties as the interlocutors
between state and society and the need for effective party systems to
channel and represent interests. However, gender issues, while sometimes
mentioned, are rarely addressed in any sustained manner.
It is now increasingly recognised that, while institutions have an
important place in any analysis of democratic consolidation, these debates
tend to have an overly narrow focus, both in terms of the procedural and
electoral definitions of democracy used – which exclude broader notions
# Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman argue this in The Political Economy of Democratic
Transitions (Princeton, 1995) and G. O’Donnell, L. Whitehead and P. Schmitter (eds.),
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore, 1986) is an example of this type of early
work.
$ See Larry Diamond, ‘ Is the Third Wave Over? ’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 7, no. 3
(1996), pp. 20–38 ; Adam Przeworski et al., ‘What makes Democracies Endure? ’,
Journal of Democracy, vol. 7, no. 1 (1996), pp. 39–55 ; Phillippe Schmitter, ‘The Dangers
and Dilemmas of Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, no. 2 (1994), pp. 57–74.
% J. Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation (Baltimore,
1996), p. 5.
& See Scott Mainwaring, ‘Presidentialism, Multipartism and Democracy: the Difficult
Combination’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 26, no. 2 (1993), pp. 198–228 ; S.
Mainwaring and T. Scully (eds.), Building Democratic Institutions : Party Systems in Latin
America (Stanford, 1995) ; Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’, Journal of
Democracy, vol. 7, no. 2 (1994), pp. 55–69.
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of the quality of democracy – and in terms of the range of actors and
institutions analysed. More nuanced analyses would also examine the
interaction of institutions with a wider range of actors within civil society,
looking for example at ‘how social actors adapt to these institutions, and
which conditions encourage (newly) mobilised actors to support, sidestep
and}or subvert democratic institutions ’.’
This article will attempt to do a number of things. First, it will build
on the mainstream literature by adding a gendered analysis of institutions
missing to date. Second, it will widen the analysis to include a hitherto
ignored area : the interaction between institutions and different women
and women’s movements. It also aims to contribute to the women and
transitions literature by adding a much needed institutional dimension.
Indeed not only the mainstream democratisation literature failed to
analyse the impact of institutions. Much of the writing on women and
transitions in Latin America has displayed similar characteristics. While
not focusing on the actions of elites, the women and transitions literature
has also often been overly voluntaristic, tending to privilege the actions
of women’s social movements and women’s mobilisations. It would be
wrong to underestimate the important contribution made by this work.
We now know a great deal about the significant role played by women’s
movements in many cases of regime breakdown in Latin America and this
has provided a useful corrective to the gender blindness of the majority
of the mainstream scholarship.( However, until recently, little has been
done to examine the interaction between women and political institutions
during attempts at democratic consolidation in Latin America.)
Although a small body of work is beginning to emerge on women and
some aspects of competitive electoral politics in Latin America, the most
useful studies to provide pointers and frameworks for the gendered study
’ Deborah Yashar, ‘Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and the Postliberal challenge
in Latin America ’, World Politics, vol. 52, no. 1 (1999), p. 99. See also Guillermo
O’Donnell, ‘ Illusions about Consolidation’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 7, no. 2 (1996),
pp. 34–51.
( S. Alvarez, Engendering Democracy in Brazil (Princeton, 1990) ; E. Jelin (ed.), Women and
Social Change in Latin America (Zed, 1990) ; J. Jaquette (ed.), The Women’s Movement in
Latin America : Participation and Democracy (Boulder, 1994) ; Georgina Waylen ‘Women
and Democratisation: Conceptualising Gender Relations in Transition Politics ’, World
Politics, vol. 46, no. 3 (1994), pp. 327–54.
) There are exceptions, see Alvarez, Engendering Democracy in Brazil ; Nikki Craske,
‘Remasculinization and Neoliberal State in Latin America ’, in Vicky Randall and
Georgina Waylen (eds.), Gender, Politics and the State (London, 1998), pp. 100–20, and
Elisabeth Friedman, ‘Paradoxes of Gendered Political Opportunity in the Venezuelan
Transition to Democracy’, Latin American Research Review, vol. 33, no. 3 (1998), pp.
87–136.
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of contemporary competitive electoral politics look almost exclusively at
the liberal democracies of the first world, focusing primarily on the United
States, Britain and Scandinavia.* Some of this more general ‘gender and
politics ’ literature highlights the need to consider political institutions and
structures. It underlines the need to examine the effect of different party
structures on the position of women within political parties, and the
impact of different systems of candidate selection – whether centralised}
local and formal}informal party systems – on the numbers of women
selected. The relationship between different electoral systems and levels of
women’s representation is also important : for example the influence of
proportional representation versus first past the post systems, party and
district magnitude, open or closed lists and rates of incumbency on the
numbers of women elected. Once in office, it is useful to examine how
women vote, behave and legislate."!
This literature has also been concerned with the relative efficacy of the
different strategies that can be used to improve women’s representation
and the role played by women organising inside and outside political
parties to achieve this. In the area of gender-related policies, attention has
focused on welfare and more recently on state women’s machineries, such
as women’s ministries and how they operate – an issue that has been
becoming an increasingly important in many Latin American countries.""
In contrast to much of the women and democratisation literature, this
kind of approach demonstrates the significance of analysing the nature of
political structures and institutions and the activities of women involved
in them.
In order to gain a fuller understanding of the complex processes at
work during recent attempts at democratic consolidation in Latin
America, gendered analyses of institutions, such as political parties and
the state, are a necessary component. This entails a consideration not only
* For examples of the emerging literature on women and competitive electoral politics
in Latin America see Mark Jones, ‘ Increasing Women’s Representation via Gender
Quotas : the Argentine Ley de Cupos ’, Women and Politics, vol. 16, no. 4 (1996), pp.
75–98 ; and Richard Matland and Michelle Taylor, ‘Electoral System Effects on
Women’s Representation: Theoretical Arguments and Evidence from Costa Rica ’,
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 30, no. 2 (1997), pp. 186–241. For work that analyses
the first world see R. Darcy, S. Welch and J. Clark, Women, Elections and Representation,
2nd ed (Lincoln NE, 1994) ; J. Lovenduski and P. Norris (eds.), Gender and Party Politics
(London 1993) ; P. Norris and J. Lovenduski, Political Recruitment : Gender, Race and
Class in the British Parliament (Cambridge 1995) ; W. Rule and F. Zimmerman (eds.),
Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective : Their Impact on Women and Minorities
(Westport, 1994).
"! See S. Thomas, How Women Legislate (Oxford, 1994) for a study of the United States.
"" For a first world perspective on state feminism see D. M. Stetson and A. Mazur (eds.),
Comparative State Feminism (London, 1995).
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of the impact of women and women’s movements on institutions and
structures, but also of how these institutions and structures can shape and
change gender relations and women’s activities in particular settings.
Political struggles are inevitably mediated by the institutional context in
which they take place. The ways in which institutions can shape not only
actors ’ strategies and their outcomes, but also their goals need to be
investigated."#
This article will therefore examine the interaction of the strategies and
goals of various actors with differing institutions and their outcomes.
Many of the actors under consideration share similar goals, but the
strategies adopted to achieve those ends vary in different institutional
contexts. The goals can be divided into two related but distinct parts : first
to increase the number of women involved in politics, particularly at
national levels either as elected representatives in legislatures or within
political parties ; second to achieve the implementation of ‘women-
friendly ’ policies often through institutional measures such as the
establishment of state women’s machineries. It becomes important to ask
whether different types of party structure and systems – such as
presidential versus parliamentary or weak versus strong party systems –
afford women actors differential opportunities for participation and
influence in consolidating electoral systems in Latin America ; and
whether these systems exhibit differences in terms of their gender-related
policies. This focus will complement the mainstream literature which
examines institutional characteristics, such as constitutional design and
party institutionalisation, seen as playing an important role in democratic
consolidation in Latin America, but which almost entirely ignores both
gender relations and the actions of different women and women’s
movements."$
This undertaking will be pursued by means of a comparative analysis
of Argentina from 1983–98 and Chile from 1989–98. These two Southern
Cone countries were chosen as case studies because, despite their many
similarities, they have had somewhat different experiences of transition
and consolidation. Given the variations both in transition politics and
women’s organising, a comparative approach will allow us to see whether
any common themes and questions emerge that can help to provide a
framework for the gendered analysis of contemporary competitive
"# Thelen and Steinmo, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics ’.
"$ For example A. Lijphart and C. Waisman (eds.), Institutional Design in New Democracies :
Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder, 1996) ; Mainwaring and Scully (eds.),
Building Democratic Institutions ; M. Shugart and J. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies :
Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge, 1992).
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electoral politics in other Latin American cases, in addition to drawing
some conclusions about the significance of events to date in each country.
The Terms of Transition in Argentina and Chile
It has been increasingly recognised that the particular form taken by the
non-democratic regime and the nature of the transition to competitive
electoral politics play an important role in structuring the nature of the
subsequent regime, including the opportunities available to various
political actors."% Haggard and Kaufman refer to this as the ‘ terms of
transition’."& They argue that the particular terms structure not only
civil}military relationships, but also political competition and the
institutional arrangements of the new system. As the contrasting cases of
Chile and Argentina demonstrate, the capacity of the military to shape the
outcome of the transition depends in part on the circumstances of their
withdrawal, for example whether there is an economic crisis or military
defeat as in Argentina or a negotiated withdrawal from a position of
strength as in Chile. However, Haggard and Kaufman argue that the
terms are not necessarily settled at the time of transition and, while they
exert a powerful influence on subsequent events, they can be subject to
some renegotiation."’
A gendered analysis of democratic consolidation in Latin America must
begin by examining the terms of transition, both in terms of the impact
different groups of women had on those terms and the ways in which the
terms helped to structure both gender relations and women’s activities
subsequently. Mala Htun, for example has argued that the different
institutional configurations established by the terms of transition have a
crucial impact on subsequent gender policy outcomes."( It has generally
been acknowledged that in many cases women’s movements played an
important part in the initial breakdown of authoritarian rule. However,
with the very partial exception of the Chilean case, this role was not often
translated into influence over the nature of the reconstituting political
"% Terry Karl argues in ‘The Dilemmas of Democratisation in Latin America ’, Comparative
Politics, vol. 23 (October 1990), pp. 1–21 that pacted transitions offer the greatest
likelihood of democratic consolidation. This is echoed in Linz and Stepan, Problems of
Democratic Transition and Consolidation.
"& Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, p. 109.
"’ Ibid., p. 270.
"( Although she overstates the determining influence of a narrow range of institutional
factors, Mala Htun’s analysis does demonstrate the need for more institutional analyses
of gendered policy outcomes. See M. Htun, ‘Democratic Transitions and Women’s
Family Rights in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile ’, paper delivered at Meeting of the Latin
American Studies Association, Miami, March 2000.
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parties and institutions or high levels of women’s political represen-
tation.") These difficulties have been seen as evidence that women’s
organisations find the transition from activity in civil society to activity in
political society problematic. But greater specificity is needed. Women’s
organisations had been part of the opposition to military rule, but had to
rethink their anti-statist position under the new conditions of transition
and consolidation. Reminiscent of old debates around ‘autonomy versus
integration’, different organisations made different choices about their
strategies and goals. Some adopted a position of critical negotiation with
the state and formal arenas. Early analyses demonstrated that some
women and women’s organisations, often middle class, professional and
feminist, that engage with political society have had some degree of
success in achieving their goals. Others, often autonomous feminists,
human rights organisations and popular movements, have opted for less
interaction with political society and have been arguably less effective in
achieving their aims."* It is therefore necessary to develop a more
sophisticated analysis of the relationship between different groups of
women and the terms of transition in Latin America.
An analysis of the role of women’s organisations in the case study
countries indicates that they had little influence over the Argentine
transition, but some influence in the Chilean case. In Argentina the
military withdrew in the midst of economic crisis and military defeat and
an exit under these circumstances constrained the influence of the armed
forces over the terms of transition. The Argentine transition has been
characterised as an un-pacted and ‘free ’ transition in which the political
parties could refuse the overtures of the military and in which, as a
consequence, few restrictions were placed on the political system.
Argentina returned to its 1853 constitution, which has been seen as the de
jure and de facto source of subsequent hyperpresidentialism, allowing
executive dominance and rule by decree.#!
Some attempts were made by the presidential candidates to woo women
voters in the elections of 1983 with promises of changes to discriminatory
laws such as Patria Potestad and discussion of divorce.#" But despite the
relative openness of the transition, the influence of women’s groups was
limited. A number of feminist organisations such as the Movimiento para
Liberacio! n Femenina and the Asociacio! n de Mujeres Argentinas had
") See for example Jaquette (ed.), The Women’s Movement in Latin America, and J. Jaquette
and S. Wolchik (eds.), Women and Democracy : Latin America and Central and Eastern
Europe (Baltimore, 1998). "* Waylen, ‘Women and Democratization’.
#! Carlos S. Nino, ‘Hyperpresidentialism and Constitutional Reform in Argentina ’, in
Lijphart and Waisman (eds.), Institutional Design in New Democracies, pp. 161–74.
#" Patria Potestad gives fathers legal rights over children within the family.
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emerged in the 1970s but they were not in a strong position to influence
events because of their small size, strategies and loose organisation. They
were accustomed to working in small groups in consciousness raising and
self-reflection and to see politics in terms of individuals rather than
groups.##
The potentially more influential human rights group, the Madres de la
Plaza de Mayo, had been an important force in bringing about the ‘end
of fear ’ under the dictatorship and delegitimising the military government
internationally through their campaign demanding the return of their
disappeared children (so much so that Alfonsı!n used their rhetoric and
slogan ‘We are Life ’ in his electoral campaign). Although the diminished
power of the military facilitated the trial of some of those accused of
human rights abuses, the Madres saw few of their demands met fully both
during and after the transition.#$ It has been claimed that, in common with
other human rights movements, ‘ the origins and nature of the movement
– which had made it uniquely effective under authoritarian rule – limited
its ability to respond to the new democratic environment ’.#% A number of
factors contributed to this. The symbolic, ethical and non-negotiable
nature of the Madres ’ demands was effective in a political environment in
which bargaining was impossible. But in the context of transition and
consolidation, bargaining became more effective. In addition ‘ the de-
termined, charismatic and single-minded leadership’ which was needed
under military rule was often inappropriate for the new political
conditions. However, Brysk argues that while the human rights
movement achieved less than it had intended, unprecedented and
significant reforms were implemented that ‘would have been weaker, or
later, or perhaps would not have happened at all without the Argentine
human rights movement ’.#&
In contrast Chile provides perhaps a classic example of a longer, non-
crisis led, negotiated transition in which the military regime was able to
play a key role in constructing a new system which was designed to ensure
that its vision of the world would be maintained. The military exercised
## Marı!a del Carmen Feijoo! and Marcela Nari, ‘Women and Democracy in Argentina ’,
in Jaquette (ed.), The Women’s Movement in Latin America, p. 118.
#$ The human rights movement wanted a bi-cameral commission to investigate human
rights abuses, the punishment of all those responsible for the repression, the immediate
release of all political prisoners and the retirement of all members of the police and
judiciary in place during military rule. None of these demands was implemented in full.
For example the bi-cameral commission was downgraded to a 10 member non-
representative body appointed by the President and the trials were limited by the Punto
Final and Obediencia Debida which prevented the prosecution of the vast majority of
those identified by testimonies. See A. Brysk , The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina:
Protest, Change and Democratization (Stanford, 1994)
#% Brysk, The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina, p. 20. #& Ibid., p. 63.
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a significant degree of control over the transition through the constitution
of 1980, creating an electoral system which would ensure the over-
representation of the right and a two party system to replace the historic
three-way division.#’ In addition the president and executive were given
extensive potential powers, including control over legislation. However,
between Pinochet’s defeat in the 1988 plebiscite and the 1989 elections,
some of the terms were re-negotiated. The number of elected senators was
increased and the opposition centre-left coalition, the Concertacio! n,
moderated its position on human rights, dropping its call for the
abrogation of the 1978 amnesty law and shifting its human rights policy
from an equal emphasis on the need for truth and justice to one which
prioritised truth.#( The military regime also wanted to ensure that the
conservative gender relations it had attempted to enforce would
endure. One of the regime’s last acts was to outlaw therapeutic abortions
that had been legal since 1931. At the same time the regime stipulated that
the wife of the head of the armed forces, rather than the spouse of the new
president, should remain the head of the state-controlled women’s
organisation, CEMA-Chile (Centros de Madres-Chile) which it had used
to try to co-opt poor women.#)
However, in what has been seen as its highpoint so far, the Chilean
feminist movement was more organised by the mid- to late 1980s than had
been the case during the earlier transition in Argentina.#* Feministas
(feminists) and polıU ticas (women political activists) made more concerted
attempts to influence the terms of the transition.$! Following the strategic
decision of many feminists to enter the unfolding political process in the
mid 1980s, for example by participating in the Asamblea de la Civilidad
#’ A binomial system replaced the open list PR system in both houses. To win both seats
in one district, the winning slate has to poll two thirds of the votes cast, otherwise the
second seat goes to the grouping with the next largest vote. The right can win the
second seat in many cases. The presence of nine appointed (in addition to the elected
ones) senators gives the right an in built majority in the senate. Peter Siavelis and
Arturo Valenzuela, ‘Electoral Engineering and Democratic Stability : the Legacy of
Authoritarian Rule in Chile ’, in Lijphart and Waisman, Institutional Design in New
Democracies, pp. 77–100.
#( A. Barahona de Brito, Human Rights and Democratization in Latin America : Uruguay and
Chile (Oxford, 1997), p. 104.
#) This prompted the Concertacio! n to establish a new women’s organisation PRODEMU
(Programa de Desarrollo de la Mujer) more securely under Christian Democrat control
to work primarily with poor women.
#* See Alicia Frohmann and Teresa Valdes, ‘Democracy in the Country and in the Home:
The Women’s Movement in Chile ’, Documento de Trabajo no. 55, FLACSO (Santiago,
1993).
$! Natacha Molina , ‘Propuestas Polı!ticas y Orientaciones de Cambio en la Situacio! n de
la Mujer ’, in Manuel Garreto! n (ed.), Propuestas polıU ticas y demandas sociales, vol. 3
(Santiago, 1989), pp. 31–172.
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in 1986, they worked within the political parties of the centre and left,
campaigning for an increase in influence for women within the party
structures.$" Women in the Partido Socialista (PS) organised a women’s
section, the Federacio! n de Mujeres Socialistas (FMS). As a consequence,
in the aftermath of the 1988 plebiscite the umbrella left grouping Partido
por la Democracia (PPD) and PS introduced quotas for women for
internal party bodies (but not candidate selection) of 20 per cent in the
PPD and 25 per cent in the PS.
These efforts culminated in the formation of the Concertacio! n de
Mujeres por la Democracia, a group of women active in the parties of the
centre-left coalition, the Concertacio! n, together with independent
feminists. Disillusioned with the continued lack of influence of women on
the unfolding political process and the selection of very few women
candidates for the forthcoming elections, the women’s Concertacio! n
elaborated a programme to be incorporated into the Concertacio! n’s
election manifesto. This included a proposal for the institutionalisation of
‘women’s interests ’ in the state through a women’s ministry.$# In
contrast, groups outside the political process such as the predominantly
female human rights agrupaciones (groups) such as the AFDD (Agrupacio! n
de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos), had far less influence over the
transition. While they maintained critical support for the centre-left
opposition, they disagreed with the abrogation of the amnesty law and
were unhappy with the ‘political contingency’ that emphasised rec-
onciliation and prioritised truth over justice, making the trial of all those
accused of human rights abuses impossible.$$
In both cases, the terms of transition culminated in the reconstitution
of rather conventional institutional arrangements with the re-emergence
of traditional parties and ‘business as usual ’ in gender terms. But the
picture is complex. The relatively speedy unpacted transition in Argentina
saw a return to the previous form of presidential system, while in the
longer negotiated Chilean transition the military attempted to refashion
the political system. In Argentina no women’s organisations influenced
the terms of transition despite the relative lack of institutional constraints.
However, in Chile despite the greater constraining influence of the
military, the very different conditions in combination with larger and
$" Natacha Molina and Claudia Serrano, ‘Las mujeres frente a la polı!tica ’, Proposiciones,
vol. 16 (1988), pp. 107–26 ; and Marı!a Elena Valenzuela, ‘Mujeres y polı!tica : logros y
tensiones en el proceso de redemocratizacio! n’, Proposiciones, vol. 18 (1990), pp.
210–231.
$# See S. Montecino and J. Rossetti, Tramas para un nuevo destino : propuestas de la
ConcertacioU n de Mujeres por la Democracia (Santiago 1990).
$$ Barahona de Brito, Human Rights and Democratization, p. 121.
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better organised women’s organisations actively engaging with many of
the political parties, meant that some groups did have more impact on the
terms of transition. In both countries the influence of the human rights
groups over the terms of transition was more indirect than direct. The
following section examines the impact that differing terms of transition
and institutional contexts had on the constraints and opportunities
available to the different actors and their responses.
Competitive Electoral Politics in Argentina
Although Argentina has been identified as having a tendency towards
hyperpresidentialism (particularly prior to the constitutional reform of
1994), its party system is fairly well institutionalised and parties remain
significant political actors.$% For many women activists attempting to
increase levels of gender equity in politics, parties therefore remain an
important focus for pressure, despite the central role that can be played by
the president in either promoting or preventing change.
Since the 1940s Argentina’s political history has been dominated by the
military and Peronism, a populist movement with its own political party,
the Partido Justicialista (PJ), whose corporatist and statist tendencies are
hard to characterise on a left}right continuum. The Union Cı!vica Radical
(UCR), a more liberal middle class political party, also played a role.
Carlos Menem, a Peronist, won the 1989 presidential election after the
economic failure of Alfonsı!n’s UCR government, elected in 1983 because
(unlike the Peronists) it was untainted by the repression and failures of the
outgoing military regime. Although he pursued a very un-Peronist
programme of neo-liberal economic reform, Menem proved to be a
populist leader who halted the trend towards the greater insitutionalisation
of the PJ and presided over increasing presidentialism within the
Argentine system. Amid growing allegations of corruption, Menem
frequently governed by decree and even struck a deal with Alfonsı!n that
allowed him to remain in office for another term in return for a reduction
in presidential powers.$&
On the return to civilian rule, very few women were elected to
congress. In the 1983 elections, only 3.6 per cent of the new deputies were
women and this proportion was maintained in the elections of 1985 and
1987. However, beginning a trend followed in other parts of the region,
$% Mark Jones, ‘Evaluating Argentina’s Presidential Democracy 1983–95 ’, in Scott
Mainwaring and Mathew Shugart (eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America
(Cambridge 1997), pp. 259–99.
$& James McGuire, ‘Political Parties and Democracy in Argentina ’, in Mainwaring and
Scully (eds.), Building Democratic Institutions, pp. 200–45.
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a significant institutional change to the electoral system was introduced
that resulted in a large increase in the number of women deputies. The Ley
de Cupos (the quota law), passed in 1991, stipulated that at least 30 per cent
of all electoral candidates were to be women, placed in winnable positions
on the closed party lists. Although it was clear that women were not to
be positioned at the bottom of lists, there was some vagueness as to
exactly what a ‘winnable ’ position entailed. If, for example, there were
only three candidates on a list, it was open to dispute whether the law
required that a woman should be placed in the second or third position.
Overall the Ley de Cupos brought some important changes. Selection
procedures were not to be determined exclusively by political parties, but
also by law. The result was a significant increase in the numbers of women
elected.
Given that the legal institution of a quota system affecting all political
parties – rather than one introduced by an individual party – was then so
unusual, it is important to ask why it was passed in Argentina. Three main
reasons can be identified. Part of the explanation lies in the history of
Peronism. During the first Peronist government in which Eva Pero! n
(Evita) played a significant role, unofficial quotas for women existed
within the PJ and the number of women in congress reached nearly 25 per
cent in the early 1950s. Thus the notion of quotas for women was not
without precedent in Argentine political history. Second, although put
forward by a Radical, the 1991 quota law was supported by an alliance of
different women. Women activists from within the political parties,
particularly the PJ and UCR, were joined by groups of women, including
feminist NGOs, organising outside the parties.$’ The government
women’s body, the Consejo Nacional de la Mujer (established in 1991)
also participated actively in the campaign, which involved mobilisation to
lobby congress and the careful targeting of particular deputies. Feminists
involved in the campaign have argued that a deliberate part of the strategy
was to stress that quotas would help to make Argentina a modern and
fully democratic society and as such they were attempting to use the
opportunities afforded by the political context of consolidation.$( Third,
the support of President Menem was also crucial as, at that time, he was
sympathetic to ‘women’s issues ’ and was known to favour the quota law.
While it is still too early for a comprehensive analysis, it is possible to
draw some interim conclusions about the impact of the Ley de Cupos on
Argentine politics. At first, although the numbers of women elected
$’ M. J. Lubertino, Informe sobre la ley de cuotas (Buenos Aires, 1993).
$( Interview with Gloria Bonder, Director of CEM and ex-member of Menem’s women’s
cabinet, 20 May 1996.
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increased so that in 1993 women comprised 13.2 per cent of the total
number of deputies, the parties did not comply fully with the new law,
despite the continued mobilisation by women both in and outside the
parties to support it.$) Initially only an individual woman who felt
wrongly treated could challenge the list, thereby risking the wrath of her
party. At the same time, judges adjudicating the cases were sometimes
antagonistic.$* After changes instituted in the 1994 constitution, which
allowed the Consejo Nacional de la Mujer and others to challenge party
lists and the continued mobilisation in support of the law, the compliance
rate increased with the majority of parties placing women in electable
positions.%! As a result 27.7 per cent of the deputies elected in the 1995
elections were women, a figure which was maintained in the 1997
elections. There is also evidence that the presence of the quota law has a
‘contagion’ effect. It brings increased pressure to bear on other institutions
and organisations, such as trade unions to introduce similar measures. For
example, by 1998 quota laws had been enacted for provincial elections in
21 of Argentina’s 24 provinces.%"
The constitutional assembly of 1993 provides one clear example of the
impact of the Ley de Cupos. Elections were held according to the quota law
and as a result 26.2 per cent of the assembly members were women who
organised across party lines on some issues. After pressure from women
members, in addition to the clauses that strengthened the Ley de Cupos, the
UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) was enshrined in the constitution. Marı!a del Carmen
Feijoo! , a feminist member of the constituent assembly, has argued that as
a result of intense cross party activity, a clause outlawing abortion under
any circumstance was prevented from being inserted, despite pressure
from Menem.%# These examples show that the actions of the women
members of the constituent assembly were rendered more effective by the
cross party alliances that they made.
$) The percentage of women elected as deputies was 21.3% but because only half the seats
were contested the percentage of women in congress only rose to 13.2%.
$* For a discussion of the implementation of the quota law see Mark Jones, ‘ Increasing
Women’s Representation via Gender Quotas : the Argentine Ley de Cupos ’, Women and
Politics, vol. 16, no. 4 (1996), pp. 75–98.
%! Mala Htun and Mark Jones argue that three institutional factors influence the
effectiveness of quotas : the type of party list, a placement mandate and district
magnitude. See Mala Htun and Mark Jones, ‘Engendering the Right to Participate in
Decisionmaking: Electoral Quotas and Women’s Leadership in Latin America ’, in
Nikki Craske and Maxine Molyneux (eds.), Gender, Justice and Rights in Latin America
(forthcoming, 2001).
%" Mark Jones, ‘Gender Quotas, Electoral Laws and the Election of Women: Lessons
from the Argentine Provinces ’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 31, no. 1 (1998), p. 21.
%# Interview with Marı!a del Carmen Feijoo! , feminist academic and member of the 1993
Constituent Assembly, Buenos Aires, 25 May 1996.
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At the same time a number of other factors act to reduce the impact of
the quota law. Compliance still varies between regions and parties. The
Ley de Cupos is often disregarded in the provinces that historically have
elected fewer women than the capital and the UCR tends to place women
in worse positions on its lists than the PJ. The impact of the Ley de Cupos
is further restricted because it is not applied to internal party offices. There
are still very few women in positions of power within party hierarchies.
Despite forming 47.7 per cent of party affiliates, in 1993 women formed
an average of only 7.2 per cent of national party directorates.%$ Finally,
some people, particularly non-aligned feminists, are sceptical about the
kinds of women who have been elected as a result of the quota system.%%
It has been suggested that some are party hacks thought to be manipulable
by party hierarchies now searching for malleable women candidates, while
others are the partners}relatives of male politicians.
Although the numbers of women elected to congress have increased,
there have been very few women in the executive since 1983. The first
woman minister ever to have held office in Argentina was not appointed
until 1989. In 1992, perhaps as an alternative to having women in
mainstream government positions, Menem instituted a parallel ‘women’s
cabinet ’ with no power. The (unpaid) role of ‘Menem’s women’ was to
shadow the real cabinet, advising different ministers on how their policies
would affect women, yet with no formal powers of oversight. However,
this never really functioned, especially after Menem’s actions described
below alienated some of the feminists who had previously been
sympathetic to him. And it was not until 1996 that Menem appointed his
first woman cabinet minister, and then to the rather gender-typical
position of the education portfolio.
The Alfonsı!n and Menem governments both established different sets
of women’s machinery. After creating a number of programmes based in
other ministries, the UCR government established the Subsecretarı!a de la
Mujer in 1987, which had become more active under a feminist leadership
by 1989.%& With the election of Menem, in 1991 this was replaced by a
new organisation, the Consejo Nacional de la Mujer, charged with
ensuring the implementation of CEDAW and ensuring the ‘maximum
participation of women in all spheres ’.%’ This body was established by
%$ See Informe Nacional : situacioU n de la mujer en la uU ltima deU cada en la RepuU blica Argentina
(Buenos Aires, 1995).
%% This opinion was expressed by Sylvia Chejter, feminist and member of Centro de
Encuentros Cultura y Mujer (CEYCM), Interview, Buenos Aires 28 May 1996.
%& Zita Montes de Oca claimed that under her leadership the Subsecretarı!a took more
overtly feminist positions. Interview (Buenos Aires, 2 June 1996).
%’ Informe Nacional ; SituacioU n de la Mujer en la uU ltima deU cada en la RepuU blica Argentina, p. 20.
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decree as part of the presidential office and as part of the government of
the day and not as a permanent part of the state apparatus. Initially when
Menem was still sympathetic, the Consejo had quite a large budget that
reached its peak in 1993. It also played an important role in the run-up to
the Beijing women’s conference. The Consejo produced an equal
opportunities plan for 1993–4 and established a number of programmes
for example to increase women’s political participation. However, Virginia
Franganillo, its feminist-sympathising head, was forced out after
campaigning against the government attempt to insert the anti-abortion
clause into the new constitution. This issue was a source of conflict in
Cairo (the population conference) as well as in Beijing, where the
Argentine official position was the most conservative in Latin America.%(
Franganillo’s removal prompted the resignation of some feminist
members of the women’s cabinet and signalled the end of the cordial
relations that the Consejo had enjoyed with some feminist groups outside
the state. After a long delay she was replaced by a staunch Peronist who
was fiercely opposed to reproductive rights.%) As a consequence few
feminist NGOs maintained links with the Consejo, and despite the
implementation of a $14m government Inter-American Development
Bank-funded plan to establish Consejos Provinciales de la Mujer to
implement programmes in every province, there was a feeling that it had
been marginalised from any policymaking role.%*
The major political parties have been an important focus of activity for
many women attempting to increase the influence of women in politics.
A women’s section of PJ was formed in the early 1980s and, following
pressure from women in the Federal Capital, the party’s regulations and
charters were amended in 1988 to introduce some positive action
measures.&! Some women within parts of the UCR have also made
increased efforts to improve the position of women in the party.&" While
activity initially focused on the capital, the first national meeting of
%( No representatives from the Consejo were included in the official Argentine delegation
to Beijing, which was against abortion under any circumstances.
%) In an interview, Ester Schiavone, Presidenta of the Consejo, was very keen to identify
herself as a menemista, (Buenos Aires, 3 June 1996).
%* Many feminists I interviewed in 1996 argued that two very different Consejos had
existed – one before and one after Franganillo’s resignation. They were enthusiastic
about the first and had no contact with the second.
&! Gloria Bonder and Marcela Nari, ‘The 30% Quota Law: A Turning Point for
Women’s Political Participation in Argentina ’ in Alice Brill (ed.), A Rising Voice :
Women in Politics Worldwide (New York, 1995), pp. 93–111.
&" Marı!a Luisa Storani, a UCR activist and researcher for the Fundacio! n Karacachoff,
claimed that in her section of the UCR women activists were making concerted efforts
to effect change in the party, Interview (Buenos Aires, 31 May 1996). Jutta Marx has
undertaken a large-scale study of women’s role in the UCR in the Capital Federal in the
1980s. See J. Marx, Mujeres y partidos polıU ticos (Buenos Aires, 1992).
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Radical women was held in 1989.&# Since the early 1990s, one strategy of
women party members has been to press for the implementation of the
Ley de Cupos internally.
However, as a consequence of what McGuire terms the ‘movementist ’
tendencies of both Peronism and Radicalism, despite strong identities
both parties tend to have weakly institutionalised structures.&$ In the PJ
there is a wide gulf between formal party rules and the actual power
structure and this is reflected in the ways that both leaders and candidates
are actually selected.&% The existence of different factions within the parties
and regionalism have meant that women have been able to exert much
more influence in Buenos Aires than outside of it. Even a new grouping
such as the centre-left FREPASO (Frente del Paı!s Solidario) has few
highly institutionalised structures. FREPASO was only established in
1995 and is trying to present a new and fresh image free of corruption.
Although it has one very prominent women leader (Graciela Ferna!ndez
Meijı!de) together with a number of feminists active at the grassroots, it
has few other women in powerful positions.
While there have been more feminists active in political parties since the
1980s, the historic tensions between feministas and polıU ticas have not been
eliminated. Although some cross-party organising and interaction
between politically aligned feminists and female party activists takes place,
the high level of party affiliation among women political activists is seen
by many ‘autonomous feminists ’ as a negative factor. Autonomous
feminists believe that a commitment to feminism is inevitably diluted by
partisan political loyalties, as illustrated by the disputes between feministas
and polıU ticas at the huge annual Women’s Encuentros.&& At the same time,
female party activists express frustration with feminists who, they claim,
do not appreciate the difficult situation they are in as regards occasional
conflicts of loyalty.&’
As indicated by the preceding discussion, a number of feminist NGOs
have been organising outside the state to influence the political system and
increase women’s representation, for example the Fundacio! n Mujeres en
Igualdad has set up training sessions for women politicians and produces
&# Lubertino, Informe sobre la ley de cuotas.
&$ McGuire, ‘Political Parties and Democracy’, p. 200.
&% Steve Levistsky, ‘Populism is Dead: Long Live the Populist Party ’, paper presented
to the Latin American Studies Association Congress, Washington, 1995.
&& This was a view expressed by Piera Orea, member of Taller Permanente de la Mujer,
Interview (Buenos Aires, 31 May 1996).
&’ Juliana Marino, leader of the Peronist Group on the Buenos Aires Council argued that
feminists just talk on their own account and do not represent anyone while she and
other party activtists represent many people and therefore face different constraints.
Interview (Buenos Aires, 6 June 1996)
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a magazine Mujeres en PolıU tica. It has also coordinated a network of
feminist organisations to provide one voice to interact with and influence
the political system and state more effectively.&( However, not all
women’s organisations have pursued the same strategy of integration and
interaction. In 1986 the Madres of the Plaza de Mayo split over questions
of goals and strategies, such as whether to interact with the state and
political parties and whether to accept compensation for the death of their
children. The breakaway Lı!nea Fundadora and the Abuelas opted to
involve themselves in the political system while the remaining Madres did
not.&)
In sum, a number of changes have occurred in Argentina since the
return to competitive electoral politics. The relatively open institutional
context bequeathed by the terms of transition facilitated some legal
changes such the introduction of shared Patria Potestad. The Ley de Cupos,
the most significant institutional change in gender terms, has changed the
electoral system and amended the terms of transition and resulted in an
increase in the number of women in congress, despite scepticism about the
calibre of some of the women elected. The actions of women organising
outside the state to influence the political system have played a key part
in achieving and maintaining the pressure for institutional change. The
potential impact of the quota law is demonstrated by the influence
exercised by a substantial number of women organising together in the
constitutional assembly. Despite the relatively high party discipline in
congress, the cross-party organising seen in the constituent assembly has
also been replicated by some women deputies. In 1996 a reproductive
rights proposal was put forward by a woman from the Radical party and
was supported by some Peronist deputies together with feminist NGOs
outside congress.&* But although they can facilitate cross-party alliances,
factionalised parties with relatively weakly institutionalised structures are
difficult to pressure for changes in their internal organisation. Despite
&( Zita Montes de Oca, the director of the Fundacio! n Mujeres en Igualdad and
coordinator of the NGO network argued for an alliance of women’s NGOs to be able
engage with the state with one NGO being able to speak for several. Interview (Buenos
Aires, 2 June 1996).
&) The Madres objected to the exhumations of unidentified bodies, arguing that they
already knew who was dead; what they needed to know was who killed them. The
Abuelas co-operated as they wanted to discover the identities of the female victims and
whether they had given birth in order to trace any surviving children and secure their
return. Interviews with Hebe Bonafini, Presidenta of the Madres (Buenos Aires, 3 June
1996) and Rosa Rosanblit, member of the Abuelas (Buenos Aires, 4 June 1996).
&* A number of feminist NGOs campaign around reproductive rights and participate in
Latin American networks as well as lobbying nationally. Interview with Mo! nica
Gogna, Member of the Co-ordinating Commission of the Foro por los Derechos
Reproductivos (Buenos Aires, 18 May 1996)
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organising by female party activists, the increase in the number of women
deputies has not been accompanied by a similar increase in the number of
women at the top of party hierarchies. Nor has there been a marked
increase in the numbers of women in government or the implementation
of policies favourable to women. Under an extremely presidential system
congress lacks power. As demonstrated by the fate of the Consejo,
presidentialism has meant that some gains are dependent on presidential
whim and there are fewer opportunities to press for meaningful
institutional change and the implementation of ‘women friendly ’ policies.
Competitive Electoral Politics in Chile
In Chile a strong institutionalised party system has been resurrected which
operates within an electoral system designed by the military regime. The
Concertacio! n, the centre-left coalition dominated by the Christian
Democrats, has won a majority in all congressional and presidential
elections held since 1990. But despite repeated attempts, it has been unable
to fundamentally alter the terms of transition. The efforts to abolish the
nine appointed senators have not yet succeeded as it does not command
the necessary two-thirds majority in Congress and so far it has been
unable to reach agreement with the right.’! Indeed Pinochet, on retiring
as Commander of the Armed forces has become a senator for life.’" The
political parties, particularly of the centre-left, and the government
women’s body SERNAM (Servicio Nacional de la Mujer), established in
1991, have remained the focus for women political activists who wish to
build on the limited, but nonetheless real, gains achieved during the
transition period.
Despite the establishment of the Concertacio! n de Mujeres in the run-up
to the elections, few women members gained seats in the 1989 elections,
forming only 5.8 per cent of the total. However, three of the seven women
elected had been prominent members of the Concertacio! n de Mujeres and
since then there has been a strong feminist contingent among the women
deputies. Although fewer women were mobilised for the ‘MaU s Mujeres al
’! However, under the terms of the constitution, the Concertacio! n is now appointing its
own senators and Aylwin could also become a senator for life.
’" At the time of writing, Pinochet’s future was uncertain. He was forced to spend 503
days in the UK waiting to see whether an extradition request for human rights abuses
lodged by a Spanish judge would be granted. Since his return to Chile in March 2000,
having been released buy the British Home Secretary on humanitarian grounds on
account of ill health, the Santiago appellate court has been considering a request
for Pinochet’s immunity as senator-for-life removed, so that he can face trial for
human rights abuses which occurred in his regime after 1978 and which are thus not
covered by the amnesty the military government granted itself.
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Parlamento ’ campaign during the 1993 congressional elections, some
attempts were made by the Concertacio! n as a whole to place women in
safe seats, with party leaders putting pressure on districts to adopt
women. However, candidates were selected through primaries and
campaigns required huge financial resources, both factors that reduce the
likelihood of women being elected.’# In spite of these limited efforts only
11 of the resulting 120 Concertacio! n candidates in 1993 were women.
Nonetheless, those parties with positive discrimination for internal
positions did field more women candidates : the PS had the most with
four, the PPD had three while the Christian Democrats (PDC), by far the
largest group overall, had only two. No women senators and nine women
deputies were elected in 1993 (six from the Concertacio! n and three from
the right), forming eight per cent of the total, and others who had been
expected to win seats were narrowly defeated.’$
In the 1997 congressional elections, only 81 of the 442 candidates for
the lower house and 10 of the 66 candidates for the senate were women.
Of the major parties, only the PDC fielded a woman candidate for the
senate and as a consequence only two women were elected to it, one from
the PDC and the other a right-wing independent.’% The Concertacio! n
fielded 15 women candidates for the lower house and, continuing the
pattern set in 1993, only four were from the PDC (five per cent of their
total) ; five each were from the PS and PPD (19 and 17 per cent of their
respective totals). On the right, seven (13.5 per cent) of the candidates of
the renovated right party Renovacio! n Nacional (RN) were women while
five (11 per cent) of the pinochetista Unio! n Demo! crata Independiente
(UDI) candidates were women. The results of these elections continued
the gradual increase in the number of women deputies, with the 13 women
elected comprising ten percent of the total of which seven come from the
Concertacio! n and four from RN (with none from the UDI).’& Women
now make up 19 per cent of the PPD deputies, 18 per cent of the PS
deputies, 16 per cent of the RN deputies and only five per cent of the PDC
’# In a primary system, potential candidates for a seat compete amongst themselves to
gain the support of local party members to win the candidacy. Positive action measures
are therefore difficult to enforce in this kind of system. In 1993 feminists complained
that potential women candidates were forced to compete against each other in
primaries in the same electoral districts.
’$ Patricio Navia and Jose! Marı!a Sandoval, ‘Women Candidates and the 1993 elections
in Chile ’, paper prepared for the Congress of the Latin American Studies Association,
Washington, 1995.
’% Of the other eight women candidates, four came from the Partido Humanista, three
from the Communist party and one stood as an independent candidate for the ‘Chile
2000 ’ alliance.
’& Of the other two, one is an independent and the other a member of the Unio! n de
Centro Centro Progresista.
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deputies. Despite the relatively strong party discipline within the Chilean
party system which mitigates against cross-party alliances, women
legislators of the Concertacio! n do have some limited contact with some
sympathetic women politicians in RN on issues relating to the welfare of
women, children, and families. The impetus for the 1994 Abandonment
and Family Support Bill, which stipulated the level of support for a
deserted partner and children, came from women representatives from
both the Concertacio! n and RN. However, the potential for cross-party
alliances is limited because of the politicisation of gender issues such as
divorce and reproductive rights, so areas that threaten the gender status
quo are excluded.’’
Within the political parties, although it is estimated that women make
up 40 per cent of grassroots activists in the Concertacio! n, and 50–60 per
cent of the activists on the right, there are fewer women in most party
central executives and governing bodies, though there are significant
differences between the parties.’( The parties vary in their willingness to
promote women, either internally or as candidates, whether through
informal measures or formal ones such as quotas. Although they all
acknowledge the need for more women to be involved in politics, their
strategies to achieve this vary. The parties of the right are opposed to any
form of affirmative action while, until recently, the centre parties of the
Concertacio! n coalition only implemented some limited positive action for
candidate selection and the PS and PPD – the renovated left parties within
the Concertacio! n – used positive discrimination in the form of quotas but
only for party posts.’) It is important to ask how far the differences in
women’s participation exhibited by the different parties of the Con-
certacio! n can be related to the incidence of positive discrimination and
formal quotas.
Feminists have continued to be active within the parties of the
centre}left using a number of strategies and tactics to increase women’s
influence. Many feminists have changed their views as to the most
effective way to organise in political parties since the return to competitive
electoral politics. At the instigation of women activists, a vice-president
for women was created in the PS in 1992 to ensure that gender concerns
would be mainstreamed in the party. This occurred after the growing
recognition that, despite raising awareness of gender issues, the FMS (the
party women’s section) had very little power and capacity to pressurise
’’ Fanny Pollarolo, the feminist PS deputy for District Three (Calama) and PS Vice-
President for Women, stressed this in an interview with the author (Santiago, 23 Jan.
1996)
’( This information comes from Riet Delsing who undertook research on positive action
measures for women within the Chilean political parties for SERNAM in 1995
(interview, Santiago 19 Jan. 1996). ’) Ibid.
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party institutions and had become ghettoised, doing little to advance the
position of women within the PS.’*
Quotas have also remained a key concern for female party activists on
the centre}left. In the mid 1990s, many feminists in the PS and PPD
expressed doubts about a quota system, arguing that, although the
numbers set by the quotas were attained at many levels, they were not
large enough to form a ‘critical mass ’ of women which would enable
significant change to occur within the parties. If anything, they argued,
the quotas might act as a ceiling to prevent the number of women from
increasing further.(! However, although initially ignored, compliance
rates have increased significantly and quotas have been extended. The PS
increased its quota for internal party positions to 30 per cent and more
recently the PDC, following pressure from PDC women, adopted quotas
of 20 per cent for some internal party positions. These quotas have
resulted in an increase in the numbers of women in internal party
positions. In 1997 there were no women in the political commissions of
the right-wing parties, but in the Concertacio! n parties, women formed 33
per cent of the PS political commission (up from 20 per cent in 1994) ; 27
per cent of the PPD political commission (up from 21 per cent in 1994)
but only 17 per cent of the PDC Consejo Nacional (up from 10 per cent
in 1995). An attempt has also been made to alter the electoral system
through the introduction of national quotas. In 1997 a bill ‘ to promote the
right of women to participate in national public life ’ was introduced into
congress by prominent Concertacio! n women deputies such as Fanny
Pollarolo and Mariana Aylwin. Although this died in committee, it
proposed that neither sex should form more than 60 per cent of internal
party positions or candidates for municipal or national elections.(" The
executive control over legislation, combined with the lack of women on
important congressional committees means that it is very difficult for
women deputies to get laws passed without strong backing from the
government even with cross-party support.(#
At the governmental level, there have been few women in the executive
since 1990. Aylwin’s cabinet contained only one woman, Soledad Alvear,
the head of the Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (SERNAM). Two women
’* Fanny Pollarolo was hopeful that the creation of this position would enable women
activists to have more influence on the mainstream of the party (interview, Santiago,
23 Jan. 1996).
(! Marı!a Antonieta Saa, the PPD diputada, ex-mayor of Conchali and women’s
representative in the Asamblea in 1986, stressed this in an interview (Santiago, 18 Jan.
1996).
(" The deputies who introduced the bill realised that it would not succeed but wanted to
raise the issue of quotas. For a discussion of the difficulties of ‘ feminist policy making’
see Liesl Haas, ‘Legislating Equality : Influences on Feminist Policymaking in Chile ’,
Paper presented at XXI LASA Congress, Chicago, 1998. (# Ibid.
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were initially appointed to cabinet by the Frei administration: the ex-head
of SERNAM who then became the justice minister together with
SERNAM’s new head, Josefina Bilbao, but subsequently this number
increased to three.
The establishment of SERNAM is the principal means by which the
Concertacio! n has tried to implement its programme on women. It was
created in 1991 and modelled on similar bodies in Brazil and Spain in a
form very much influenced by the proposals of the Concertacio! n de
Mujeres described earlier. Its mission is to ‘collaborate with the executive
in the design and coordination of public policies which put an end to the
levels of discrimination which affect women in the family, social,
economic, political and cultural arenas ’.($ After pressure from women
activists, it was established in law rather than by presidential decree and
its head was appointed at cabinet level. But after opposition from the right
and the Catholic Church, who claimed that the law would subvert the
family, its budget and functions – including the ability to execute
programmes – were scaled down and it was placed under the auspices of
MIDEPLAN, the planning ministry.(%
SERNAM has undertaken a variety of activities. It has focused on three
main areas : campaigns to increase gender awareness, pilot and targeted
group projects, and legal reforms. It has, for example, established a
network of regional offices and CIDEMs (Information Centres on
Women’s Rights) ; published an equal opportunities plan with a clear
feminist orientation to be addressed in public policies for the period
1994–9 ; and run awareness raising campaigns around such issues as
domestic violence and illegitimacy. As part of the executive, it has
presented bills to Congress which have subsequently become law, as well
as providing crucial support through lobbying for bills introduced by
deputies such as the intrafamily violence law.(& It has also worked in
conjunction with other new state bodies, such as the anti-poverty
programme FOSIS (Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversio! n Social), and
PRODEMU (Programa de Desarrollo de la Mujer), the government
created successor to CEMA–Chile which works with poor women.
However, the area of intersectoral coordination with other parts of the
state has been problematic as SERNAM lacks oversight powers and many
of its contacts with other ministries operate on an informal rather than an
institutional basis.(’
($ From ‘¿Que! es SERNAM?’ (author’s translation), http :}}www.sernam.cl.
(% For an analysis of the establishment of SERNAM see F. Macaulay, ‘Gender Politics in
Brazil and Chile : The Role of Parties in National and Local Policy Making’, unpubl.
PhD. diss., University of Oxford, 1996.
(& SERNAM, Plan de igualdad de oportunidades para las mujeres – (Santiago, 1994).
(’ See Georgina Waylen, ‘Democratization, Feminism and the State in Chile : The
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The controversy that surrounded SERNAM at its inception has
continued. In 1995 the unresolved tensions over SERNAM were
demonstrated in the disputes before the Beijing Women’s conference. The
most vocal opposition came from the right and the UDI in particular. But
SERNAM does not just face opposition from the right, all the PDC
senators except one joined with the right in criticising the Chilean
document for Beijing, which was based on SERNAM’s equal oppor-
tunities plan. These divisions within the Concertacio! n are also replicated
within SERNAM, for example between Socialists and Christian
Democrats over divorce, and SERNAM has steered clear of contested
issues such as reproductive rights.(( As a result it has found it easier to
pursue those activities associated with employment training and poverty
alleviation, such as the Programme for Women Heads of Household
which focuses on poverty reduction by helping women with income
generation, rather than on fundamentally challenging existing gender
relations.
SERNAM also has a complex relationship with women’s movements
outside the state. Although it needs strong movements to provide it with
legitimacy, it has been seen as weakening those movements as it has
become the major interlocutor through which resources are channelled
and through which feminists are absorbed into the state. Many of its
personnel are ex-activists drawn from NGOs or academics rather than
civil servants. It has therefore had a close relationship with some of the
feminist NGOs, for example commissioning them to undertake research
for SERNAM and collaborating over the preparations for the Beijing
Women’s Conference. But its relations with the popular women’s
movements are perhaps most fraught. It now receives much of funding
that had come directly to those organisations and NGOs under the
military regime. It has little contact with popular organisations that are
often deemed to be insufficiently ‘professional ’ to receive resources.()
establishment of SERNAM’, in Shirin Rai and Geraldine Lievesley (eds.), Women and
the State : International Perspectives (London, 1996), pp. 103–117 ; Macaulay, Gender
Politics in Brazil and Chile ; and Ann Matear, ‘Gender and the State in Rural Chile ’,
Bulletin of Latin American Research, vol. 16, no. 1 (1997), pp. 97–106.
(( Divorce is illegal in Chile. Only annulment can end a marriage, therefore a large
number of marriages are annulled. Parts of the PDC are against the introduction of
divorce while other parties in the Concertacio! n are cautiously in favour. In 1992
Soledad Larrain, the socialist vice-minister of SERNAM resigned after irreconcilable
differences with the PDC minister. Larrain had spoken out in favour of divorce and
greater reproductive rights.
() Marı!a Elena Valenzuela, ‘Las mujeres y el poder : la accio! n estatal desde una
perspectiva de ge!nero en Chile ’, Paper presented at the Latin American Studies
Association XX Congress, Guadalajara, 1997.
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Thus SERNAM has a potentially clientelist relationship with some
women’s NGOs while at the same time it has ‘beheaded’ the feminist
movement through its absorption of feminists into its ranks.(*
A strong institutional party system has been resurrected in Chile in
which there are still relatively few opportunities for women. This has been
combined with the creation of a relatively unfavourable electoral system,
the product of institutional constraints imposed by the restrictive terms of
transition. As a result, despite the lip-service paid by political parties to
increase the number of women, there are still few women in congress or
in government. However, the case of Chile demonstrates that in more
formalised structures it is clearer where pressure can be exerted most
effectively. Feminist party activists have had some success in achieving
quotas for internal party offices in the parties of the renovated left and the
implementation of more fundamental changes to the electoral system has
become the goal of some feminists wishing to increase the influence of
women in conventional politics. As in Argentina, whatever gains which
been made have resulted in large part from the campaigns of women
active both inside and outside the political parties. The establishment of
SERNAM, an institution which makes some attempts to ensure the
implementation of ‘women friendly ’ policies, is the most significant
consequence of the attempts of women activists to influence the transition,
despite the institutional constraints. It has advantages over the Consejo in
Argentina because it was created by law after effective pressure from
women within Concertacio! n and feminists outside the ruling alliance. As
such the fate of SERNAM is not as dependent on the presidency.
However, the security of its position as part of the state has not yet been
put to the test by the election of a radically different government.)!
Conclusions
A gendered analysis of contemporary competitive electoral politics in
Chile and Argentina has highlighted a number of general themes that are
useful for the examination of other cases. It is necessary to focus both on
the strategies and goals of the actors, such as female party activists and
(* Veronica Schild, ‘New subjects of Rights? Women’s Movements and the Construction
of Citizenship in New Democracies ’, in Sonia Alvarez, Arturo Escobar and Evelina
Dagnino (eds.), Politics of Culture}Politics of Politics (Boulder, 1998), pp. 93–117. In a
critical analysis, Veronica Schild argues that SERNAM’s role is to prepare women for
a neoliberal form of market citizenship through those activities that focus on income
generation.
)! SERNAM staff are aware of this. For example Marı!a Elena Valenzuela, Jefa de
Departmento de Planificacio! n y Estudios (1991–7) highlighted this aspect (interview
Santiago, 20 Jan. 1996).
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women organising outside the state and political parties ; and on the
structures and institutions within which these actors operate. In both
countries the nature of the pre-existing regime, the timing of the
transition, the role (if any) of women’s movements and the resulting terms
of transition to competitive electoral politics had an important impact on
the subsequent nature of gender politics with regard to levels of women’s
representation and participation within the electoral system and party
structures.
Where women activists and women’s organisations effectively
pressurised some of the (victorious) political parties during the transition,
they had some success in getting their demands met after the restoration
of electoral politics. In Chile the Concertacio! n de Mujeres por la
Democracia lobbied the centre-left Concertacio! n coalition to include a
number of items, such as the promise to establish a state women’s
organisation, in their electoral programme. Such pressure did not occur
in the Argentine case. Despite this, although the terms of transition
established slightly different types of political system in both cases, both
were conventional in gender terms. However, as shown in the Argentine
case, these terms of transition were not fixed but were subsequently open
to some renegotiation. The quota law and the new constitution, drawn up
by a constitutional assembly made up of 26 per cent women – itself a
direct consequence of the Ley de Cupos – which incorporated CEDAW
and resisted an anti-reproductive rights clause, demonstrates that
modifications to the institutional framework are possible, particularly in
a context where the constraints created by the terms of transition are not
too restrictive.
Once competitive electoral politics have been restored, a number of
characteristics of the post transition political system are significant. First,
the Argentine case demonstrates the impact of a more arbitrary populist
or presidentialist system. Changes can be achieved. But – as the example
of the Consejo Nacional de la Mujer demonstrates – without insti-
tutionalisation they are often fragile and can be reversed without any
recourse to rules and procedures. Menem began his period in office by
appearing to be pro-women’s rights and established the Consejo by
presidential decree. However, by the 1995 Beijing conference he was
taking a more pro-Vatican line and subsequently dismissed the head of the
Consejo, reduced its budget and downgraded its activities. In contrast the
position of SERNAM in Chile appears more secure in part because it was
established after pressure from women activists and by law rather than
presidential decree.
Second, both cases demonstrate the importance of women organising
both inside and outside the state and party systems to pressure for changes
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both in the terms of transition and from subsequent civilian governments.
It is unlikely that institutionalised changes such as the Ley de Cupos in
Argentina would have occurred without this sort of activity. Women
activists within both the Peronist and Radical parties had the support of
mass mobilisations outside congress and the lobbying activities of a large
number of feminist NGOs. In both countries, a number of women’s
groups, primarily middle class and feminist NGOs that often have
contacts already with the state and the political class, have come together
to form broad umbrella groupings to lobby the political systems more
effectively. Indeed it has been argued that we are now witnessing an
‘NGOisation’ of the feminist movement and even a blurring of some of
the distinctions between NGOs and the state as NGOs increasingly take
on tasks which used to be undertaken by the state and personnel move
between the two sites.)" But in both countries popular organisations have
had little involvement, and with the exception of the Abuelas and the
Lı!nea Fundadora, the predominantly female human rights groups made
up of victims’ relatives have also had fewer dealings with the state and
mainstream political parties.
Third, the Chilean case demonstrates that although some party systems
may resist change, women activists both inside and outside the parties can
exert pressure more effectively on an institutionalised party system than
on a weak party system. In an institutionalised party system it is clearer
where the pressure points are and any changes to the rules can be enforced
more easily. However, the evidence is not unequivocal. In Chile feministas
and polıU ticas within the centre-left parties, the PPD and the PS, won quotas
for internal party positions, but soon discovered that if they were not
large enough to form a ‘critical mass ’, the quotas intended as floors too
easily became unofficial ceilings unless constant supervision was exercised.
In contrast, the Argentine case demonstrates that the relatively laxer
discipline of less institutionalised party structures allows for more cross-
party organising by women, demonstrated in the campaign for the quota
laws and subsequently over reproductive rights. Political parties therefore
remain one important focus for women activists attempting to increase
women’s influence in conventional political activity. But it is clear that the
long-established feminista}polıU tica division has not been superseded.
However, it would be a mistake to assume that the institutionalisation
of a political system is any guarantee of gender parity. Echoing
Mainwaring and Scully’s argument, it is not that hyper-institutionalisation
is good, but rather that low levels of institutionalisation produce
)" Sonia Alvarez, ‘Latin American Feminisms ‘‘Go Global ’’ : Trends of the 1990s and
the Challenges for the New Millennium’, in Alvarez et al. (eds.), Cultures of Politics,
pp. 293–324.
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problems and make lasting change difficult to achieve.)# The absence of
institutionalisation allows for the dominance of elites, patrimonialism and
clientelism that may favour individual women, but does not generally
facilitate a long-term increase in the total number of women active in
conventional politics. In an institutionalised system there is stability in the
rules of competition and party organisations matter ; therefore rules, for
example over quotas and candidate selection, can be enforced more easily.
The focus of analysis then becomes the nature of the institutional
measures proposed by women activists and the ways in which variations
in political systems, for example in terms of party structures and electoral
systems, affect both the goals and strategies of those activists. In both case
study countries electoral quotas have been the main measure advocated to
increase the number of women in both legislatures and political parties.
The different institutional contexts in Argentina and Chile meant that the
campaigns for quotas systems took different forms with different results.
The type of political system established after the return to competitive
electoral politics had an impact on the number of women elected in both
countries. The binomial system established in Chile is not one in which
women find it easy to do well. In addition, the terms of transition mean
it is very hard to alter the electoral system, thus the adoption of a national
quota system for candidate selection (which might also necessitate the
adoption of PR) would be hard to achieve. In Argentina the closed list PR
system, combined with factors such as the historical precedence for quotas
and the support of the president, facilitated the introduction of a national
quota law in a context where the un-pacted transition made the
modification of the terms of transition easier to achieve. As a result the
campaign for national quotas for candidate selection has been more
vigorous and more successful in Argentina.
The differences in party structures in Argentina and Chile have had an
impact on the campaigns to introduce quotas within the political parties.
In Argentina the weaker institutionalised structures of the main parties
have made it hard to institute effective quotas for internal party positions,
despite the ‘contagion’ effect of the Ley de Cupos. Among the more
institutionalised Chilean parties it has been the parties of the centre-left
that have been the focus of the most intense campaigns and proved more
susceptible. However, they only implemented quotas for internal
positions. The limited experience of both Chile and Argentina has
convinced many activists that quota size is also crucial, and many advocate
40 per cent as the minimum level to achieve ‘critical mass ’. Yet quotas to
)# Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, ‘ Introduction’ to Mainwaring and Scully
(eds.), Building Democratic Institutions, pp. 1–20.
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increase the numbers of women involved in all aspects of electoral politics
are not enough on their own to achieve gender parity.
It is also necessary to influence policymaking and its implementation.
In presidential systems characterised by executive dominance, legal
change is difficult to achieve without government support. While the
numbers of women in the executives in both countries have remained very
low, state women’s machineries have been the main institutional
mechanism established to oversee, and in the Chilean case promote,
‘women-friendly ’ policies. In part due to the success of feminist lobbying
at the global level, the international institutional context has become more
favourable and there is now pressure on states, often complemented by
donor financing, to implement policies to promote gender equity and to
establish state bodies to oversee these policies.)$ The different origins and
institutional context of SERNAM have made it the more influential of the
two bodies in the case study countries. Unlike the Consejo, SERNAM is
a permanent part of the state and the executive, its head holding a cabinet
post, and it is able to put forward legislation more effectively than women
legislators. SERNAM has been able to achieve some important gains, but
faces resistance both inside and outside the state and therefore experiences
important limitations, in part due to the institutional constraints generated
by the terms of transition. In contrast to the Consejo, it was set up as a
result of pressures external to the state, but it has a potentially problematic
relationship with women’s organisations, particularly as it has not lived
up to the expectations of feminists.)% Indeed evidence from Argentina
reinforces the Chilean data that the relationships between women’s
ministries and women’s movements are not straightforward and can be
conflictual.
In the study of gender and democratic consolidation in Latin America
it is therefore important to look at number of themes. First, the nature of
the political system must be examined, for example in terms of the sort of
presidential system and electoral processes established at the time of
return to competitive electoral politics as well as the institutional
constraints created by the terms of transition and the ease with which
those terms can be modified. Second, the structure of the political parties,
their levels of institutionalisation and ideological positions must be
considered. Third the nature of women’s movements – their strategies,
strength and goals – must also be analysed. The ways in which all these
)$ Sonia Alvarez, ‘Advocating Feminism: the Latin American feminist NGO ‘‘boom’’ ’,
International Feminist Journal of Politics, vol. 1, no. 2 (1999), pp. 181–209.
)% Marı!a Elena Valenzuela stressed SERNAM’s ambiguous position and how this
complicates its relations with women’s organisations outside the state (interview,
Santiago, 20 Jan. 1996).
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institutional structures and actors interact forms the final crucial element.
In sum, the consolidation of more equitable political systems in gender
terms is more likely if organised groups of women are lobbying
institutionalised party systems both from within and from outside for the
implementation of formal measures both to increase the numbers of
women active at all political levels and to implement ‘women-friendly ’
policies.
